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Mr. Leslie B. SAMUELS: I first want to say that I very much
appreciate the attendance. The topic of tax reform has been reported in the press and is a part of the political debate as well as
the tax policy debate. The idea of tax reform is an important
part of tax politics. Today's Wall Street Journal reported on how
some proponents of certain tax reform proposals had scheduled
events for April 15th, tax day. One group is going to bury the Internal Revenue Code someplace and another is going off to Boston Harbor to throw the Code into the water. 1
Although we are not going to have that kind of conversation
today, it is important to realize that these sound bite events on
tax reform are occurring at various levels. If one is going to
reach a conclusion about tax reform, however, it is extremely
important to have a serious, long-term debate on tax reform in
this type of setting.
In thinking about tax reform, I would like to mention a few
2
points about our current tax system to put matters into context.
We have basically a hybrid system. At the federal level, we have
the individual income tax which counts for roughly 45 percent of
revenues. Social Security and Medicare payroll taxes constitute
about 34 percent. Corporate income tax, on which an enormous
amount of time is spent and which makes some private practitioners great amounts of money, accounts for about 11 percent of
total federal tax receipts. The balance of 9 percent comes from
some excise taxes, customs duties and the like. Consequently,
we collect a little more than 55 or 56 percent from the individual
and the corporate income tax combined. Thus, the income tax is
obviously a very important part of the system, but it is not the
only part.
Additionally, we collect significant taxes at the state and local
level. As a percentage of our economy, the total revenue collected at the state and federal levels is roughly 30 percent.
of the Bar of the City of New York, the New York State Bar Association and the Board of
Advisors for the New York University/Internal Revenue Service Continuing Professional
Education Program. Mr. Samuels regularly lectures and publishes articles pertaining to
taxation and the law.
1 See Ronald G. Shafer, A Special Weekly Report From the Wall Street Journal's
Capital Bureau, Wall St. J., Mar. 27, 1998, at Al.

2 See Tax Code Revision, Dep't of Treasury Testimony Before the House Ways &
Means Comm., available in 1995 WL 357674 (statement of Leslie B. Samuels, Assistant
Secretary of Tax Policy) (1995) [hereinafter Teasury Testimony] (summarizing advantages and disadvantages of various tax reform proposals).
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About one third, about 10 percent, is at the state and local level.
I will return to this point in detail later, but I want to emphasize
that very serious questions about how tax reform proposals affect state funding and other federal-state relationships must be
considered in the discussions of tax reform at the federal level.
Thus far, these issues have not received adequate attention.
When you compare our tax system to those of our major trading partners, the so-called G7 countries, the United States is
among the lowest: Tax collections are roughly 30 percent of our
Gross Domestic Product ("GDP"). The United States has been
comparable with Japan, but Japan's tax burden has gone up a
little bit. If you look at France, the rate is significantly higher at
about 40 percent of GDP. Germany is close to France. Of
course, France and Germany are facing both economic problems
and restrictions on free movement of labor. Some commentators
believe that their high level of taxation, including taxation on labor income, has adversely affected their economies. When you
consider where the United States stands in relation to our trading partners, our 30 percent tax burden is at the bottom of the
scale.
As I mentioned at the outset, our income tax is a hybrid system when you compare it to a pure income tax concept from an
economist's point of view. What we have and what we had from
the outset of the income tax, is not a pure income tax; it is a hybrid system. For example, our income tax system has significant
provisions that defer or exempt income. Certain pensions receive favorable treatment; employer provided health insurance is
permitted on a tax-free basis in our system; we have tax-exempt
municipal bonds; and certain capital gains are taxed when realized at favorable rates.
On the deduction side, you find items that are deductible that
you would not find in a theoretically pure income tax. For example, deductions for charitable contributions, home mortgage
interest deductions and the deduction for real estate taxes on
homes are not allowed in a pure income tax system. I mention
some of these differences because they reflect society's choices
about what is important and what should be subsidized or favored through the tax system. This is very important to keep in
mind in discussing tax reform proposals.
Every year, both the Treasury and the Joint Committee of
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Taxation publish lists of tax expenditures which show those
provisions of the current income tax law that vary from a more
pure income tax. It is a very extensive list. Unfortunately, at
least from the perspective of the average taxpayer and even
businesses who do not benefit, the list of tax expenditures continues to grow. We have seen that quite recently.
We have a system that reflects our complex economy as well as
our political system. It also embodies the social and economic
priorities in our society. The factors that have put our tax system where it is today will clearly come into play in designing a
new tax system, or in substantially revising the current system.
It seems that in considering potential advantages and disadvantages of a new tax system, we must focus on the types of provisions and the types of choices that society is likely to continue to
want included in a tax system.
It is clear, however, that the process that has molded our tax
system has in reality created an overly complex set of rules for
the average taxpayer. I do not think there is really any great
dispute about that. Although, about 70 percent of individual
taxpayers claim the standard deduction, which eliminates a lot
of complex record-keeping, such as keeping track of potential
itemized deductions, nevertheless about 50 percent of individual
taxpayers go to paid preparers to prepare their tax returns. This
fact speaks not only to the marketing skills of the paid preparers, but it also says a lot about the average taxpayer's concern
about the system and their concern about the forms and the instructions. I have seen that in talking to people who have a very
simple return, but who worry that there might be something
that they do not understand. They do not want to do something
wrong. They want to make sure that their return is prepared in
a proper manner. Thus, that means that half the people go to
paid preparers.
The system is not only complex for the average taxpayer, but it
is also quite complex for businesses. Businesses have the resources to deal with the complexity, and sometimes they welcome it because they think they get an advantage. Nevertheless,
a great deal of money is spent on internal compliance, tracking
tax provisions, education and acquiring advice from outsiders.
Unfortunately, recent legislation, for example, the 1997 Tax
Act, has made the system even more complicated for the average
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taxpayer. There are now child credits with income limits. 3 Taxpayers will figure out education tax credits. 4 New savings incentives were enacted. 5 When you add the new credits to the tax
system, the alternative minimum tax will eventually apply to
individuals that no one thought would be subject to the alternative minimum tax when it was first put into place.
We have a system that unfortunately has become more complex. The forces responsible for this complexity are probably
going to continue. One of the reasons the tax system has become
more complex is that under our budget rules, it is easier to put
provisions into the tax code that implement a particular group's
social or economic point of view. It is easier under the budget
rules to place something into the tax system rather than having
a direct spending program, even though in many cases a direct
spending program would likely be much more efficient. It is almost irresistible to politicians to put in new tax benefit provisions; it is much more attractive for Congress to say that they
are cutting taxes rather than increasing spending. This is a part
of our political system that is not going away.
Having said that, I think that the best thing that could happen
to the tax system for the next several years is nothing. Of
course, there should be some technical corrections and I expect
that legislation this year will be targeted at reforming the Internal Revenue Service. Apart from that, both the Government and
the taxpayers deserve a rest. That would be the best thing for
the system. If that actually happened, it would permit discussion of fundamental tax reform.
The term "fundamental tax reform" generally, although not
always, is code for moving to a consumption-based tax system. I
think there are proposals that should be put into that tax reform
category, such as modifying the current system in a 1986 tax reform type of effort. We should not dismiss that type of reform.
3 See I.R.C. § 24 (1998) (providing maximum credit of $500 with respect to each
qualifying child of taxpayer); I.R.C. § 32(m) (1997) (providing for supplemental child
credit).
4 See I.R.C. § 25A (1998) (establishing Hope and Lifetime Learning Credits); I.R.C. §
135 (1997) (providing education credit when U.S. savings bonds are used to pay for
higher education); I.R.C. § 530 (1998) (providing for educational individual retirement
accounts).
5 See I.R.C. § 219 (1997) (concerning retirement savings accounts); I.R.C. § 408 (1997)
(concerning individual retirement accounts); I.R.C. § 408A (1998) (establishing "Roth"
I.R.A.); I.R.C. § 530 (1998) (providing for education individual retirement accounts).
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But I think what we are going to discuss today, and what you
hear in sound bytes from politicians, is moving from our current
hybrid income tax system to some type of consumption tax system.
When thinking about the consumption tax proposals, let me
put them in a framework for discussion. There are certain kinds
of touchstones or principles that generally are referred to in tax
policy discussions of this type. I will briefly describe some of
them.
The questions one generally should ask are: First, will a tax
system raise sufficient revenues? Will there be compliance
problems? Second, will the system be fair? An important issue
is what "fairness" means. Third, will the system promote economic growth? Finally, will the system be easy to administer
and comply with? Those are the principles questions that generally frame the tax reform discussion.
As you will see in discussing most tax policy issues, there are
important trade-offs and tensions between these principles. For
example, tax fairness and simplicity are often at odds with each
other. I would also say simplicity almost always comes in last in
designating tax rules because other considerations tend to overwhelm it.
In addition to these criteria, in any type of a radical change,
you need to consider rules to reduce windfall gains and windfall
losses during any transition period. That is a quite important.
Some people will take the position that transition rules are mere
details. While transition rules can tend to be very complex and
detailed, they involve making important decisions about allocation of wealth between different groups as you go through transition periods.
For example, in a consumption tax system, one needs to consider the treatment of elderly taxpayers who have accumulated
their assets in our income tax-type system. Generally, older taxpayers will have paid tax on income that they have saved and
invested. If you went directly from one system to the other and
the elderly then start to consume their savings, they would then
be taxed on their consumption. Also, the value of their assets
may be adversely affected as a result of a consumption tax. It
can happen in several different ways, and it is a very important
issue.
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In a consumption tax system, the treatment of financial institutions and financial transactions generally is thought to present
special problems. David has thought a lot about that and written some very thoughtful papers on it. There are some ways to
deal with these problems, but he would probably agree that it
raises special and complicated problems.
In considering a consumption tax, you have to decide how to
coordinate a new consumption tax system with the fiscal policies
of state and local governments, some of which rely on a sales tax,
a type of consumption tax. Moreover, many states rely on using
the federal income tax system as their blueprint for their income
tax system. So, if you change the federal system, you are placing
the state in a very different position.
In discussing a consumption tax, there are a variety of proposals and I am not going to go into the details. Generally, consumption tax is levied only on income that is spent on consumer
goods and services; income that is saved is effectively exempt
from tax. That is generally the way people think about it. There
are different forms of consumption tax. One is the retail sales
tax. There is a consumed income tax that then-Senator Nunn
and Senator Domenici proposed. 6 There are various types of
value-added taxes. There is the flat tax, which is a form of consumption tax promoted by Mr. Armey 7 and Mr. Forbes.8 There
is a progressive "X-tax" which David Bradford will speak eloquently about.
In considering the possible benefits of a consumption tax under the criteria I mentioned, there are a number of difficult and
challenging questions. First, will a consumption tax encourage
and promote economic growth? Often this issue is framed as
whether a consumption tax will increase private savings, thereby
lowering the cost of capital, and make our economy work on a
more efficient basis?
The question of whether the savings rate will increase as a re6 S. 722, 104th Cong. (1995) (proposing individual income and corporate income taxes
be replaced with two consumption-based taxes).
7 H.R. 1040, 105th Cong. (1997) (promoting replacement for individual and corporate
income taxes with consumption tax with two components: wage tax and cash flow tax on
businesses).

8 See John Harwood, Campaign 96: PresidentialHopeful Forbes Talks Up Flat Tax
But May Stengthen Case It's a Rich Man's Policy, Wall St. J., Jan. 2, 1996, at 381
(describing plan for 17% "flat tax" on wage income).
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sult of a consumption tax is a difficult question to answer. Advocates who believe that it will suggest that increasing the aftertax rates of returns on savings will increase overall savings. It is
my understanding of the empirical studies that the evidence is
uncertain on this issue. 9 Some people save to reach a specific
target, so that if you increase the after-tax rate of return, they
will say, "Well, I will achieve my target faster so I do not have to
save this much." Some people are just savers and some are just
spenders. It is hard to predict exactly what will happen. If economic benefits are produced by a consumption tax, they could be
small. This is a fundamental part of the debate. I think it is a
difficult question to answer.
I would mention in this context, although it is not an empirical
study, that the Japanese government recently imposed a relatively small consumption tax, a 3 percent tax that has now just
been raised to 5 percent. I was told by officials of the Japanese
Ministry of Finance that when their consumption tax was imposed, projected Japanese savings rate fell. Now, I do not know
what to conclude from that comment because other things were
happening in Japan, but these officials did not feel that the consumption tax was going to have a positive impact on their savings rate. Maybe the Japanese officials really do not think much
about the issue because Japan has such a high savings rate.
This example demonstrates to me the difficulty involved in answering the hard question of what impact a consumption tax will
have on savings in a complex economy.
Now, I would like to discuss the question of fairness. This is
the debate of whether a progressive type tax is fairer than a consumption tax. David Bradford's X-tax is designed to deal with
the progressivity issue.
To put the issue of fairness on the table, let us consider an example of one way to think about this issue. Herb Stein, who was
a head of a Council of Economic Advisors some years ago, has
used this example. A couple makes $40,000 and consumes
$40,000. Compare that couple to an individual that earns
$200,000 from interest on U.S. Government bonds and $200,000
on capital gains from trading in foreign securities-I picked
9 See Treasury Testimony, supra note 1 (noting that decline in private savings rates
in U.S. could be attributed to number of factors other than tax policy).
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those two sources of income for a particular reasonI0 - and
THAT only spends $40,000 a year. So, she spends the same
amount as the couple that makes $40,000. Under a consumption
tax, they would both be taxed on the same basis. I think there is
a question of whether society would think that is a fair tax system. You can tell from the way I posed the example that I do not
think society would accept that result as a fair system. I do not
think it is a fair system.
If you impose a consumption tax, because it is based on consumption, you inevitably will change the distribution of the tax
burden among groups as compared to our existing tax system.
Because the consumption tax is based on consumption not capital income, you inevitably will reduce the tax on the highest
groups of income earners. That raises the question of whether
our society will find that acceptable.
I believe that our current tax system is moderately progressive. I am sure that those people who are at the very top think it
is too progressive, but I think it is moderately progressive. 11
Thus, you have to look at that issue of fairness in terms of distribution of tax burden among income groups. Then you have to
look at the transition rules because big winners and losers will
result if a new consumption tax system is adopted. The question
is how to make society feel that the transition is fair-that winners and losers are treated in a reasonable way. How do you
treat your seniors? How do you treat business investment made
under the old system? How do you treat companies that are
highly leveraged that could be in a very different situation if you
changed to a consumption tax? 1 2
When you think about those types of questions and the possible adverse impact on society and on the economy, the proponents of switching to a consumption tax have an obligation of
showing in a convincing way that the potential benefits of a consumption tax are substantially greater than the significant risks
to the economy. I would add that no other economy in the world
has chosen to abandon an income tax and rely solely on a con10 Panelist's Note: Interest on U.S. government bonds and capital gains on foreign
securities are generally not included on the business tax base of a consumption tax.
1l See Treasury Testimony, supra note 1.
12 Panelist's Note: In a typical consumption tax, interest is not deducted in calculating the business tax base subject to tax, thus affecting businesses with high borrowings.
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sumption tax. Some countries have consumption taxes, but the
consumption tax is part of a broader system. Moreover, in
judging a consumption, it is realistic to assume that it is not going to be a pure system. It is going to be modified, as demonstrated, by our experience. These modifications are likely to dilute or eliminate theoretical benefits from a pure consumption
tax proposal.
So, those are the questions that one must address. I would
only add that we have had a recent political experience with one
attempt at a mini consumption tax, the proposal for the so-called
BTU tax in 1993. Those of us who were involved in that proposal
were seared by the experience. We realized that the country
does not like big changes one way or the other. They seem to
like it in the middle. The political process is a serious issue in
terms of moving to another system as is what a radical proposal
would actually look like when it came out of the legislative process.
Mr. David F. BRADFORD: I also want to say thanks for the
opportunity to be here and address this large group on a beautiful afternoon. I also want to preface this by giving just a couple
of very quick reactions to some of the things Les said, but I will
postpone in depth reactions to what I hope would be an interaction with the audience as well.
I was reflecting on why people go to tax preparers. I remember what it was like preparing my tax return myself, which I still
do actually with the help of Turbo Tax. Before Turbo Tax, I was
petrified that I would not have all the forms or there would be
some darn mistake. My attitude toward my own tax preparation
changed dramatically when I went to work for the U.S. Treasury
Department and discovered that no tax lawyer on the Treasury
Tax staff, as far as I could tell, filed a return on April 15th. That
is when I found out that as a matter of course, you filed for an
extension, and you do not worry too much about having all the
right forms because somehow it all works out.
I think most people share the view I had before I went to the
Treasury, that this is a terribly important thing and you are
terrified about making a mistake. That is probably the main
reason they go to tax preparers.
Another quick reaction, I was interested in the description of
and the reminder of the new legislation which introduced all of
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these wonderful new incentives to pay for your kids' education,
and to save, and so on. I was yet again grateful for having, to my
own surprise, succeeded so well that I make too much money to
take advantage of those things. So, I do not have to cope with
that. I was very happy to find that out.
My last preliminary statement is conditioned by the agreement with a pessimism about doing something coherent and
sensible in our political system. We have lots of reasons for being grateful for our political system so we should not complain
too much. I would also worry about anything that we might try
to do, what it might look like after it has been through the political meat grinder.
Having said that, I will try to lay out here the case for reforms
along the lines that Les has described. I have a title for this little talk. My title is, "Tax Reform: Waiting for a New Consensus
of the Experts."'13 First, this title reflects several of my own
views that there was an old consensus of the experts that contributed to a whole series of tax reforms, including the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Secondly, the title reflects that the old consensus is gone. While there are plenty who still favor it, it is no
longer the consensus. Thirdly, nothing much coherent is going to
happen in the near future until the new consensus emerges. Finally, a new consensus is visible on the horizon. I will try to explain why that new consensus probably will arise and what modest hopes it can fulfill.
I begin first with the old consensus. We are not governed by
experts. Income tax policy must reflect basic political preferences of the electorate, but experts like you and Les inevitably
shape the crucial details of regulatory systems, such as the income tax system. For example, most people, certainly most politicians, believe that rebating tax on exports and charging tax on
imports would benefit the U.S. economy. Among the most important factors preventing this belief from being translated into
practice is the consensus among tax policy experts that the intuitive views of politicians are incorrect.
For most of this century, there was substantial agreement
among experts about the general principles of an ideal income
13 Editor's Note: A modified version of David Bradford's speech was published by Tax
Notes. See 98 Tax Notes 899-901 (May 18, 1998).
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tax, known in tax jargon as the Haig-Simons concept, (or SchanzHaig-Simons, if we are bowing to other earlier predecessors who
thought of the ideas). 14 This concept remains highly influential
today and it is still, as far as I can tell, the guiding tax principle
of the U.S. Treasury, as it was when I was there.
A competing concept has been gradually edging out HaigSimons as the guiding principle: Consumption. The major component of Haig-Simons income is consumption and the other is
savings. Consumption generates a very similar distribution of
tax burdens among people of various levels of ability to pay if the
appropriately calibrated rates are applied.
From the point of view of tax design, it is my opinion that it
would be very convenient if all you experts were convinced that
consumption were the preferred framework for the income tax.
The main reason for adopting the consumption approach is
simplicity. To give an idea of why this is so, let me review the
consumption-type tax that I have labeled the X-tax and explain
why it resolves some very tough problems that are almost impossible to solve in the income tax as we now understand it.
The X-tax is a variant of the flat tax which was introduced by
Robert Hall and Alvin Rabushka of Stanford. 15 It is a two component system consisting of a business tax paid by all businesses, whether corporate, proprietorship or partnership, and a
compensation tax paid by all who receive compensation for service, as employees or the equivalent. All businesses pay tax at,
illustratively, 30 percent, on a base consisting of the receipts
from all sales of all types, including sales out of inventory or
sales of other existing assets, less the outlays for purchases from
other businesses. Tax aficionados will recognize this as a subtraction-style value-added tax ("subtraction-style VAT"), and
thus a form of consumption tax because all inter-business transactions net out. The only thing that generates tax revenue on
balance is sales to the public and we can call that consumption.
What businesses sell in the aggregate to the public certainly can
be thought of as consumption. That is one reason we would call
that kind of a value-added tax, a consumption tax.
Now, there is a twist in the X-tax. In addition, businesses de14 Named after Georg von Schanz, Robert Haig and Henry Simons, this concept defines income to be net accretion to wealth plus consumption.
15 See ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX (2d ed. 1995).
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duct their payments to workers, whether for past, present, or future services. These are taxed at the recipient level under the
compensation tax, the second component. All workers pay tax on
the amount received from businesses (or payments of the same
character from non-tax paying entities such as governments and
universities).
If the tax rate on compensation were the same as the business
tax, we would still have the equivalent of a subtraction-style
VAT. Instead, however, total compensation is taxed progressively, with an earned income credit at the low end, a zero
bracket range, and successively higher graduated rates on higher
levels of compensation. For example, the graduated rates might
be 10, 20 and 30 percent on successively higher levels of compensation above some exempt amount. Maintaining the top rate of
the individual compensation tax at the same rate that applies
under the business tax is an important design principle.
No other receipts at the individual compensation tax base,
such as interest, dividends, etc., would be included. That is important. It is that individual element, the earned income credit
equivalent and the graduated rates, that give you the progressivity in this system. Certainly on an average basis, it would not be
a problem duplicating the progressivity of our current tax system. What we would have then is a consumption tax plus adjustments to worker's burdens according to the levels of their
earnings. That is the X-tax.
Why should anybody favor such a thing? Why should the experts out there reach a consensus on such a thing as a replacement for the individual and corporation income taxes? Most importantly, the X-Tax satisfies one of the important requirements
of our tax system, vertical equity. That is, it can match the present tax system's progressivity. This is presumably a requirement of reform, even though it is not really necessary that progressivity be provided by the thing we call a tax instead of things
we call transfers. Why should we suddenly decide we are going
to radically change the progressivity of our system?
Second, and now I come to the substance, the X-tax makes
taxation much simpler and more transparent than we have now.
(It would, for example, render moot essentially all of the Journal's program today). For today's purposes, I propose just to illustrate some advantages of such an approach.
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All of the important problems, the hard problems, that are
solved by the X-tax have to do with what is typically labeled
"capital income." Most importantly, financial transactions of all
kinds (dividends, capital gains, etc.) are completely gone from
the tax base of both individuals and companies. Let me give you
some examples of what happens by doing that.
FINANCIAL INNOVATION: In the past couple of decades
and in an earlier panel, you have seen amazing innovations in
finance in this country and around the world. A great deal of the
ingenuity of Wall Street's rocket scientists is directed toward obtaining the best tax results in connection with any particular
economic activity, including making a profit at the expense of the
U.S. and other governments. On the other hand, the tax rules
themselves often get in the way of desirable financial innovation,
resulting in a waste of ingenuity. Both the wasted ingenuity and
the obstacles to innovation would be gone under the X-tax. People could fiddle around all they want and make all those creative
arrangements they want, and it would not affect their tax liabilities.
RESOLVE THE INTEREST DEDUCTION MESS: Moreover,
the X-Tax would resolve the interest deduction mess. The almost incomprehensible web of special rules relating to the
treatment of interest payments and receipts that has grown up
in the existing tax system would be gone.
CAPITAL GAINS: I need hardly remind you what a controversial and complex subject this is. The fights over capital gains
would be a thing of the past (business assets are accounted for
on a cash flow basis; individually owned financial instruments do
not enter the tax base).
ADJUSTING THE BASE FOR INFLATION: This is a technical matter. Removal of the financial transactions from the tax
means that adjusting the base (as opposed to the brackets) for
inflation would be feasible, relatively simple, and confined to the
business level (actually, the adjustment would be completely
automatic but for transition considerations to which I allude
briefly below). It is very easily shown that even very modest
rates of inflation result in very substantial incentives and
changes of tax burdens. Correctly regarded as important by tax
experts, indexing the tax base for inflation is generally considered impractical in the existing system. Adjusting the base for
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inflation would not be difficult at all under the X-tax if you
wanted to do it.
LEVEL PLAYING FIELD FOR INVESTMENT: Under the existing income tax, owner occupied housing is favored. It is taxed
at a very low effective rate compared to, let's say, a General Motors assembly plant. Under the X-tax, uniform treatment of
business investment would be automatic, regardless of legal entity and rate of inflation, for example, and requiring no judgment
about the correct amount of depreciation. Owner occupied assets
of all kinds including automobiles and yachts and so forth, as
well as houses, would automatically be taxed the same as business investment. Most economists think that it is very important that there would be very major gains through this change.
These are gains that are kind of hard to explain to people because they are not obvious, but most economists believe that you
could really get a big payoff from that. We would be richer. We
would be more prosperous. Wages would be higher.
CUT THE COMPLEXITY OF RETIREMENT SAVINGS: The
immensely complicated rules relating to the qualification of a
retirement saving for sheltered treatment under the present system would become entirely unnecessary. Essentially, all savings
would receive the same treatment now reserved for qualified retirement plans, meaning exemption of the yield. So those rules
designed to prevent tax abuse (as opposed to fiduciary matters),
which make this area one of the most specialized in the world of
tax practice, would be superfluous. Of course, you would still
want to protect people's pensions plans from going bankrupt but
the tax aspect would be gone.
INTEGRATE CORPORATION & INDIVIDUAL TAXATION:
Closely related is the automatic integration of corporation and
individual tax accounts. Such integration has long sought by tax
reformers and is somewhat controversial. The complex rules
regulating corporate restructuring and distributions, deriving
basically from a need to distinguish corporate debt and equity,
and rules distinguishing (Subchapter C) corporate from other legal forms of business enterprise, resulting in strange incentives
to organize subsidiaries as pass-through or not, or hybrid entities, etc., would be gone. You would not need to distinguish Subchapter C entities from others.
FACILITATE INDIVIDUAL FILING: This is an incidental ad-
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vantage. A rarely noted feature of the X-Tax is that it would
facilitate individual filing, thereby eliminating marriage taxes
and subsidies. Many people worry about the marriage tax or the
marriage bonus; either way most people are worried about the
tax. Whether this is desirable as a matter of policy is obviously
debatable, but the division of property income that makes individual filing difficult under the present income tax is not a
problem for the X-Tax since "property income" is taxed uniformly
at the business level.
LOSING
WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE X-TAX?
CHERISHED DEDUCTIONS: It is commonly thought that the
X-Tax would necessarily do away with cherished features of the
existing income tax system. Some of these are deductions, such
as the mortgage interest deduction, or the subsidy to state and
local bond interest, which would truly be unnatural components
of the X-Tax. Others, such as the reciprocal deduction and inclusion of alimony, the deduction of charitable contributions and
state and local taxes, and the exclusion of employer-provided
health care, would present the same policy issues as in the present income tax. Most, however, can be accommodated without
losing the simplification advantages I have cited.
TRANSITION IMPOSSIBLE? What about the transitional
difficulties that Les mentioned? Could we get from here to there
without unduly penalizing older citizens or randomly sprinkling
around gains and losses? You cannot make big changes like this
without making some gains and losses, but I think the gains and
losses could be substantially moderated relatively easily. Because the X-Tax is so simple and uses mostly information already required for the income tax, it can be instituted as a new
schedule on the income tax. The first couple of years, pay 80
percent of the bottom line of the existing tax and 20 percent of
the X-Tax. Then make the proportions 60 percent-40 percent
and so on. After the required number of years, the existing tax
system would be phased out. That is an example that does not
require complicated transition rules.
(Although it would take me beyond the scope of today's presentation to develop the point, I should note that transition considerations do, however, suggest we should consider substituting
income style accounting for business investment, together with
an interest allowance on undeducted basis, for the universal ex-
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pensing regime I have described above. This is too bad, but does
not, I think, extract a huge loss in the advantages I have described.)
THE BIG ENCHILADA: The big problem that keeps the experts from unanimously supporting the X-Tax is that it exempts
capital income from tax, a fact that many people consider a terribly regressive thing to do.
In my view, these experts have been paying too much attention
to words and not enough to substance. To illustrate my point,
consider what it would take to convert that X-tax to an income,
rather than a consumption base. All that would be required
would be to substitute conventional income accounting for business capital expenses, substitute depreciation allowances, and
inventory accounting etc. for the immediate write-off characteristic of the X-tax business component.
It seems evident to me that postponing my deduction for a
capital outlay by some number of years is not the difference between rags and riches. That is not how the great fortunes are
made in this or any other economy. Great fortunes are made by
inventing Microsoft DOS or monopolizing the cigarette industry.
Such sources of wealth are taxed alike under either the consumption-type or the income-type value-added tax.
WHAT IS IN A NAME? The labels "consumption" and "capital
income" divert commentators from looking at what is actually
going on. The valid point is that, in principle, the difference between income and consumption taxes is the treatment of the
risk-free reward to waiting, certainly below 2 percent per year. I
say "in principle" because in practice, actual income taxes are
very far from the Haig-Simons ideal that I mentioned at the beginning.
WAITING FOR A CONSENSUS: Eventually, the tide of expert
opinion will shift decisively in favor of the consumption ideal,
and I hope we will postpone major reform until that happens.
Such a new consensus, however, will not bring an end to tax
politics. Rather, it will open up at least a possibility of a significantly simpler income tax system, one that accomplishes its essential distributional and revenue raising functions more objectively and with far less waste.
Professor Jacob L. TODRES: Although I think we could go on
fruitfully for quite a bit of time, I think we have to stop and let
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our keynote speaker address us. I do just want to point out that
David Bradford's pamphlet that was distributed is a very good
source for an introduction to the area. 16
MR. BRADFORD: Please mention my co-author.
PROF. TODRES: Joel Slemrod is the co-author. I found it very
informative preparing for this and I recommend it to those of you
who have an interest in seeing what the actual details are,
rather than just the news snippets which is a lot of what we get.
On behalf of the school and the St. John's Journal of Legal
Commentary and myself, I thank you gentlemen very much for
coming here and for carrying the debate.

16 DAVID F. BRADFORD & JOEL SLEMROD, MAKING TAX CHOICES, A GUIDE TO THE

ISSUES AND THE ALTERNATIVES (Nathan Associates Inc., 1996) (on file with the St. John's

Journal of Legal Commentary).

